First edition published: Boston : Pearson Addison Wesley, 2007.

Includes bibliographical references (pages 605-634) and index.

Individual decisions : risk aversion, prospect theory, and learning. Risk and decision making ; Prospect theory and anomalies ; Bayes' rule ; Belief elicitation and ambiguity aversion ; Individual social learning -- Behavioral game theory. Some simple games : competition, coordination, and guessing ; Multi-state games, noisy behavior ; Randomized strategies ; Choice of partners, Social dilemmas ; Contests and rent seeking ; Methodology, nonparametric tests -- Social preferences. Bargaining ; Trust, reciprocity, and principal-agent games ; Voluntary contributions ; The volunteer's dilemma ; Externalities, congestion, and common-pool resources ; Voting and politics experiments -- Market experiments. Monopoly, cournot, and cross-market price competition ; Market power, collusion, and price competition ; Supply chains ; Adverse selection in lemons and insurance markets ; Assett markets and price bubbles ; Bank runs and macro experiments -- Auctions and mechanism design. Private value acutions ; The winner's curse ; Multi-unit auctions : emmisions, water, license plates, securities ; Combinatorial and two-sided auctions ; Matching mechanisms.

"Economics is rapidly becoming a more experimental science, and the best way to convey insights from this research is to engage students in classroom simulations that motivate subsequent discussions and reading. In this expanded and updated second edition of Markets, Games, and Strategic Behavior, Charles Holt, one of the leaders in experimental economics, provides an unparalleled introduction to the study of economic behavior, organized around risky decisions, games of strategy, and economic markets that can be simulated in class. Each chapter is based on a key experiment, presented with accessible examples and just enough theory. Featuring innovative applications from the lab and the field, the book introduces new research on a wide range of topics. Core chapters provide an introduction to the experimental analysis of markets and strategic decisions made in the shadow of risk or conflict. Instructors can then pick and choose among topics focused on bargaining, game theory, social preferences, industrial organization, public choice and voting, asset market bubbles, and auctions."--Publisher's description.